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Proactivity routines: The role of social processes in how employees self-initiate change 
Heather Vough, Uta K. Bindl and Sharon K. Parker 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Proactive work behaviors are self-initiated, future-focused actions aimed at bringing about 
changes to work processes in organizations. Such behaviors occur within the social context of 
work. The extant literature that has focused on the role of social context for proactivity has 
focused on social context as an overall input or output of proactivity. However, in this paper we 
argue that the process of engaging in proactive work behavior (proactive goal striving) may also 
be a function of the social context it occurs in. Based on qualitative data from 39 call center 
employees in an energy-supply company, we find that in a context characterized by standardized 
work procedures, proactive goal striving can occur through a proactivity routine- a socially 
constructed and accepted pattern of action by which employees initiate and achieve changes to 
work processes, with the support of managers and colleagues. Our findings point to the need to 
view proactive work behaviors at a higher level of analysis than the individual in order to 
identify shared routines for engaging in proactivity, as well as how multiple actors coordinate 
their efforts in the process of achieving individually-generated proactive goals.  
 
Keywords 
Proactivity, qualitative methods, routines, standardized work 
 
    
 
Anybody that tries to bring in anything new sort of has to go about it the right way.  
-Philip, Customer Service Agent 
 
Proactive work behavior is a process (e.g. Bindl et al., 2012; Sonnentag & Starzyk, 2015) 
whereby individuals recognize potential problems or opportunities in their work environment 
and self-initiate change to bring about a better future work situation (Parker & Collins, 2010: 
636). Proactive work behavior has generally been conceptualized as a relatively autonomous set 
of actions performed by individuals and is promoted by individual or job characteristics (e.g. 
Bindl & Parker, 2010; Frese, et al., 2007; Thomas et al., 2010; Tornau & Frese, 2013). However, 
as the opening quote by Phillip indicates, individuals in organizations do not act in a vacuum. 
Their work is often interdependent with the work of others meaning that to engage in proactive 
work behaviors individuals need to be attuned to the broader social context, including who to 
involve in the proactivity process and how to go about the process.  
However, although employees, like Phillip, recognize that the social context shapes how 
employees engage in the process of bringing about proactive change, this issue is not clearly 
explained by extant theory on proactive work behaviors. While research has focused on social 
determinants that motivate employees to engage in proactive actions (Baer & Frese, 2003;  de 
Jong & de Ruyter, 2004; Den Hartog & Belschak, 2012; Fay et al, 2004; Griffin, et al., 2010; 
Rank et al., 2007; Strauss, et al., 2009) as well as how proactive work behavior may lead to a 
variety of social outcomes (Gong, et al., 2012; Griffin, Neal, and Parker, 2007 Li, et al., 2010; 
Thompson, 2005), we have little insight on how the social context influences the way in which 
individuals actually go about making change. Without such theory, our understanding of the 
proactivity process does not reflect organizational realities. For example, an employee working 
    
 
on an assembly line who identifies and makes changes to any inefficiencies in her work 
processes would likely also bring about change for other employees who complete the same, or 
interdependent, work. As such, she may need to involve others in the process of making the 
change in order to avoid resistance or even downright refusal to implement such changes. Thus, 
there is a social component to the process of proactivity that has been unrecognized. Further, 
there may be contextually appropriate ways of going about making proactive changes. Campbell 
(2000), for instance, suggests that managers often encourage proactive behaviors, but expect 
them to be carried out the same way the manager would carry them out. The implication here is 
that the process through which employees bring about proactive behavior may become somewhat 
standardized. Accordingly, we suggest that our understanding of proactive work behavior can be 
meaningfully advanced by focusing on the role that social context plays in the process of 
engaging in proactive work behavior, as well as routines that support and enable proactivity 
within the organization. In order to do so, we must shift our analytic focus from the individual 
actor to the broader system of interactions during an episode of proactive work behavior.  
To better understand the role of the social context in the proactivity process, we 
performed a qualitative study of 39 employees in the call center of a multinational energy 
supplier based in the UK. In order to sustain organizational efficiencies, the work of the call 
center employees was highly standardized across individuals, meaning that any changes one 
person made to their work needed to be adopted by others as well. Our analysis led to two key 
findings. First, we found that proactivity at the call center was fostered by a “proactivity 
routine”: a socially constructed and accepted process by which individual employees could 
initiate team or unit level changes in their work processes. Once individuals identified changes 
that they felt needed to be made in their work and decided to take action to make such changes, 
    
 
they followed a specific pattern of action to implement the change. We refer to this process as a 
proactivity routine because it was shared across organizational members, enabling proactive 
work behaviors even in a low autonomy setting. Second, in this context, employees did not enact 
proactivity alone, but, rather, coordinated with colleagues and managers in their efforts to bring 
about change in their work contexts. We draw on organizational routines research to elaborate 
theory on how the social context influences the process of proactivity and suggest the value of 
viewing proactivity as a social phenomenon.  
We believe that our findings have significant implications for our understanding of 
proactivity in organizations. First, our findings point to the need to re-frame how we view 
proactivity in organizations. By viewing individual proactivity as embedded in more macro-level 
processes in the organization, we see that proactive work behaviors can occur via a more uniform 
process (i.e. a routine) than has been previously considered, especially in standardized or 
interdependent work settings. Second, we suggest that interpersonal interactions play a larger 
role in proactivity at work than is often recognized. We find that individuals interact with and 
rely on others in order to accomplish their own proactive goals. Our findings, thus, expand 
beyond the notion that interpersonal interactions are inputs or outputs to employee proactivity by 
describing how multiple actors are engaged throughout the proactivity process. Finally, our 
findings challenge the conventional wisdom that proactivity is limited to high autonomy contexts 
(see, for instance, Frese et al., 1996; Fuller et al., 2006). We demonstrate that even in low-
autonomy environments, such as call centers, individuals may engage in proactive work 
behaviors, provided there is a clear routine that supports such behaviors. While it may seem 
counterintuitive, the development of a proactivity routine to ensure that work processes remain 
    
 
consistent across individuals actually provides greater opportunity for individual agency because 
it reassured employees that it was possible and acceptable to initiate change.  
Social context in the proactivity process 
Proactivity has been conceptualized in a number of ways including using personal 
initiative to improve situations (Frese & Fay, 2001; Frese, et al., 1996), taking charge (Morrison 
& Phelps, 1999), expressing voice (Van Dyne & LePine, 1998), and revising tasks or jobs (Staw 
& Boettger, 1990; Wrzesniewski & Dutton, 2001). These behaviors have been argued to share a 
number of features that define them as proactive: first, they are future-focused, involving actions 
to achieve future goals or to prevent problems in the future, second, they emphasize taking 
control and aiming for change, and third, they involve self-initiation, or the individual taking 
self-starting action rather than being instructed to act (e.g., Grant & Ashford, 2008; Parker & 
Collins, 2010; Parker et al., 2010). In contrast to proactive strategic or career behavior, proactive 
work behavior, our focus here, involves self-initiated action aimed at changing and improving 
the working situation (Parker & Collins, 2010). While proactive actions may be taken in 
response to existing problems (e.g. Frese & Fay, 2001), the aim of proactive work behaviors is to 
improve work processes for the future. 
An emerging literature has started to investigate the role of the broader social context and 
its impact on proactive work behavior. Leadership and group climate are two elements of the 
social context that have been argued to influence the likelihood of employees engaging in 
proactive behavior. Transformational leaders encourage proactivity via increasing followers’ 
role-based self-efficacy and organizational commitment (Griffin, et al, 2010; Strauss, et al., 
2009). The relationship between transformational leadership and proactivity is strongest in 
contexts where both autonomy and self-efficacy are both high or both low (Den Hartog & 
    
 
Belschak, 2012). Further, participative leadership increases the likelihood of employee 
proactivity in customer service contexts due to increased employee involvement in work (Rank 
et al., 2007). Finally, leader support has a stronger impact on proactivity amongst individuals 
with insecure rather than secure attachment styles (Wu & Parker, in press). Thus, leaders may 
play a strong role in determining if individuals are willing to act proactively. 
In addition, a proactive organizational climate, defined as the shared perceptions that 
working practices involve self-starting actions, work innovation, and error management (Fay et 
al., 2004), has been linked to increased process innovations as well as performance (Baer & 
Frese, 2003). For instance, Fay and colleagues (2004) found that an organizational climate that 
promotes proactive behaviors may compensate for a lack of personal initiative on the part of 
managers. Similarly, de Jong and de Ruyter (2004) found that, in the context of service recovery, 
group-level perceptions of empowerment, customer complaint management, and inter/intra-team 
support fostered proactive recovery behavior. Thus, there is evidence that an organizational 
climate that supports proactivity increases employee proactivity.  
  There is also evidence that acting proactively, in turn, shapes an individual’s social 
context. The relationships that individuals build through their proactive behaviors, especially 
with their managers, can result in increased job performance and organizational citizenship 
behavior. In particular, Thompson (2005) found that network building and initiative taking were 
important mediators between employee’s proactive personality and job performance. Similarly, 
Li, Liang, and Crant (2010) found that employees with proactive personalities were more likely 
to establish high quality exchange relationships with their supervisors which, in turn, led to 
greater job satisfaction and organizational citizenship behaviors. Gong and colleagues (2012) 
extend this logic to argue that proactive employees prepare themselves to make change by 
    
 
exchanging informational resources with others which, in turn, builds the trust that is needed in 
order to pursue potentially risky creative ideas. Taken together, the theme underlying these 
studies is that proactive individuals build relationships with others that have future benefits for 
both the individual and the organization.  
While the research reviewed above addresses how the social context encourages or 
discourages proactivity and how proactivity can shape the social context, research has not 
addressed the role of the social context in determining how proactive work behaviors are carried 
out. Recently, scholars have recognized that behaving proactively is rarely a one-off action but, 
rather, it typically involves a goal regulation process. Specifically, Bindl and colleagues (2012) 
have conceptualized and found empirical support for proactivity as progressing through four 
phases: envisioning, planning, enacting, and reflecting. Envisioning involves looking for a 
different future, planning involves preparing to take steps to achieve this future, enacting 
involves self-starting action to bring about this future, and reflecting involves thinking about the 
success or failure of those actions. Grant and Ashford (2008) proposed three similar phases. 
Parker, Bindl, and Strauss (2010) drew on goal regulation theory to synthesize the four phases 
into two overarching goal processes. First, in proactive goal generation, under one’s own 
volition, one creates a goal to bring about a new and different future by changing the self and/or 
the environment. Second, proactive goal striving involves the behavioral and psychological 
mechanisms by which individuals seek to accomplish proactive goals and reflect on their 
outcomes (see also Sonnentag and Starzyk, 2015, who similarly distinguish between issue 
identification and issue implementation).   
  In viewing proactivity as a process, we can begin to investigate the ways in which social 
context shapes how proactive action unfolds, that is, the goal striving element of proactivity. 
    
 
There is some initial evidence that individuals may modify the way in which they engage in 
proactive work behavior based on the organizational context. Specifically, in their work on issue 
selling, a form of strategic proactive behavior (Parker & Collins, 2010), Dutton and colleagues 
(2001) argued that individuals need to have contextual knowledge in order to sell important 
issues to upper management. The authors found that women were highly attuned to social cues as 
they determined how to sell gender-equity issues (Dutton, et al., 2002). This research indicates 
that there are important insights to be gained by taking into consideration how proactivity is 
enacted within a particular social context. While there are certainly many ways in which social 
context can vary, here, we focus on how proactivity occurs within a social context with highly 
standardized work practices that mean that any changes to work practices must be changed 
uniformly rather than idiosyncratically. This provides the opportunity to gain new insights into 
proactive work behaviors in low autonomy contexts, which have traditionally been argued to be 
lacking in proactivity (e.g. Frese et al., 1996; Fuller et al., 2006). 
Method 
In order to elaborate theory (Lee, et al., 1999; Vaughan, 1992) on the role of social 
context in the proactivity process, we performed a qualitative study of call center employees 
using a grounded theory approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). We used an emergent strategy, 
allowing the words of informants rather than previous theorizing to provide the basis for our 
model (Shah & Corley, 2006). In particular, our research question evolved through the analysis 
of our data. We entered into data collection interested in how employees acted proactively in the 
highly constrained setting of a call center. As we analyzed the data, the importance of the social 
context and the proactivity routine emerged as important drivers of the proactivity process, 
leading us to focus our study on elaborating these themes. 
    
 
Research context and informants 
The context of this study was a call center in a large energy company based in the United 
Kingdom, which we label NRG. NRG’s call center, like a typical call center, was highly 
centralized and formalized, restricting autonomous actions on the part of frontline employees 
(Holman, 2005). The clearest indication of the impact of standardization on autonomy was the 
use of process maps. Process maps were outlines of each step an employee should take when 
completing a specific task, such as answering a call. Further, nearly all of the agents’ daily work 
activities occurred within their computer system so they were confined to what the system 
allowed them to do. Such constraints on autonomy make a call center a particularly interesting 
context for understanding how social context impacts proactive work behavior. 
Thirty-nine employees from three locations of NRG served as informants. Eighteen of the 
informants were customer service agents (“agent” or “CSA” from here on) who spent their time 
addressing customer issues including inquiries about billing issues, reporting meter problems, or 
setting up new services. For some agents, answering in-bound calls was their primary duty and 
they did it for ten hours a day, four days a week. On the other hand, there were a small number of 
agents who worked in the “back office” and were only occasionally responsible for answering 
customer calls. Instead, they worked off of task-lists to address problems in particular accounts. 
CSAs ranged from age 21-56, had mean organizational tenure of 3 years, and were 71% female. 
We also interviewed three levels of management. Ten of the informants were Team 
Managers (TM), who served as immediate managers to 8-15 agents. The team managers spent 
their time overseeing the work of the agents by observing their behaviors, listening in to phone 
calls, and evaluating performance. These informants were also responsible for taking escalated 
calls when their agents were unable to resolve issues with customers. Eight of the informants 
    
 
were Section Managers (SM) that served as direct supervisors to 3-5 Team Managers and 
managed specific divisions such as Customer Transfers, Credit Management, or Prepayments. 
Finally, we conducted interviews with three Customer Service Managers (CSM) who served as 
direct supervisors to the Section Managers, but were also responsible for strategic planning of 
their division. For the three levels of management, age ranged from 24-55, the mean tenure was 
8 years, and 71% were female. These figures resembled the percentages in the entire 
organization at the time of the investigation.  
Data collection 
Our primary source of data consisted of audio-recorded face-to-face interviews with each 
of the informants. Interviews followed a semi-structured protocol in which the questions were 
pre-determined but the interviewers also asked follow-up questions in order to probe deeper into 
the experiences of employees (see Appendix A, available online, for the interview protocol). 
After a brief warm-up, we asked employees: “Have you ever used your initiative to try to change 
or improve a situation at work?” followed by probes such as “What was the situation?” and 
“Could you describe the process from when you had the idea to when you actually engaged in 
the action?” Thirty-eight of the 39 informants produced examples in response to one or more of 
these prompts. As we progressed through the interviews we refined the protocol to delve deeper 
into emerging issues. The updated protocols were then used in the subsequent set of interviews. 
Twenty-one of the informants were interviewed a second time (including 10 of the 18 
agents) one to two months after the first set of interviews. In these interviews, we followed-up on 
proactive behaviors mentioned in the first interview by verifying our understanding of them, 
probing with more in-depth questions, and asking for updates. The informants were additionally 
asked to report any new accounts of proactivity that had occurred since the first interview. The 
    
 
multi-interview approach provided the opportunity to develop greater rapport with the 
informants and gain deeper insight into the processes under investigation (Seidman, 1991). 
Typically, the interviews in round one lasted between 45-60 minutes and in round two between 
30-45 minutes. When reporting quotations, we provide informants’ pseudonym, position, and 
whether the quotation came from the first or second interview. 
Additionally, at the outset of the study we conducted overt, non-participant observations 
(Whyte, 1979) with the two lower levels of employees. These observations helped familiarize us 
with work procedures in the call center, technical terms used, and the culture and norms of the 
organization. In particular, we were given the opportunity to shadow 15 employees and their 
managers for about two hours each while they carried out their work, which included listening 
into customer calls and watching informants manipulate the screens on their computers in order 
to address customer concerns. While notes from observations were not systematically analyzed, 
the observations served as an important point of entry into the work lives of the informants. 
Data analysis 
Although we asked each informant about their proactive work behaviors, in our analysis, 
we focused specifically on the proactivity of agents as they were the group in the study doing the 
primary work of the call center and their work differed substantially from the work of managers. 
However, we did also analyze managers’ transcripts for evidence to support or contradict the 
emerging themes from the agents’ accounts of proactive work behavior. We use the managers’ 
words to verify and add nuance to the processes reported by agents.  
We followed an iterative pattern of moving between data collection and analysis as well 
as moving back and forth from our emergent findings to the previous literature (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967). After interviews began, each interview was transcribed verbatim. We then sought 
    
 
to identify specific instances of proactive work behavior by locating each of an informant’s 
responses to our questions concerning proactive behavior then assessing whether or not they 
included each of the key elements of proactive work behavior (Parker, et al., 2010; Grant & 
Ashford, 2008). In particular, we asked: were the individuals’ actions 1) self-initiated, 2) focused 
on changing work processes, and 3) future-focused? In order to increase our confidence that 
these episodes were indeed evidence of proactive work behavior, the first author and a graduate 
student, who was trained on the definition of proactive work behavior, independently categorized 
60 informants’ responses to the proactivity questions as either proactive work behavior or not. 
The Krippendorf’s alpha for interrelater reliability for this process was .88, indicating that there 
was good reliability across raters in identifying proactive work behavior. When informants’ 
responses did not meet the criteria for proactive work behavior, it was usually because either the 
employee was not the primary instigator of the change or because the change was not aimed at 
the work itself (e.g. career or benefits related changes). Accounts in which individuals went 
beyond their basic task requirements to help customers - but did not initiate changes in how the 
work was performed in order to achieve better outcomes in the future  - were not considered 
proactive work behavior. For example, if an employee merely spent longer than normal in 
assisting or serving a customer, we did not consider this an example of proactive work behavior 
unless they set out to challenge the underlying work processes that led to the customer’s 
problem. Likewise, if an employee responded to a problem by simply solving it in the moment, 
we identified this as effective problem solving rather than proactive work behavior. For an 
account to be considered as proactive, it needed to have a future-focused element in which the 
individual went beyond reacting to the immediate issue and, instead, made changes to the work 
    
 
to prevent future re-occurrence of the problem, and/or address longer term repercussions. The 
modal number of accounts of proactive work behavior per interview was 1 but varied from 0-3.  
The first two authors coded the data using NVivo software. We began with very broad 
categories based on the existing literature, for example “phases of proactive behavior,” then went 
to the data to identify first order codes - or codes that came directly from the words of informants 
- in order to populate these, as well as other, emergent categories (Miles & Huberman, 1994; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1998). After independently coding the first interview, we met to discuss the 
similarities and differences between our coding and to agree on standardized labels for the codes. 
We then individually coded two more interviews and again met to agree on codes. After going 
through the process of coding and meeting to discuss codes three times, we began to code 
separate interviews. However, when new codes emerged in later interviews we discussed them to 
maintain consistency and avoid redundancy. We kept track of the codes through code lists that 
included the code, its definition, and a color coded representation of when it was identified. 
Once we had coded a number of interviews, our discussions began including new 
groupings for codes - or second order codes (Van Maanen, 1979) - that provided categories for 
the first order codes. For example, we coded excerpts about identifying problems as first order 
codes then grouped them via the second order code “problem recognition and ownership.” Over 
time, a number of these second-order codes emerged and we began to interpret them in relation 
to one another via a constant comparative method (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The result of this 
analysis was that some second-order codes could be grouped into larger aggregate dimensions. 
While some of these aggregate dimensions were pre-existing, others emerged from the data. For 
example, “phases of proactivity” was used from the beginning and was populated with a number 
of codes through our coding process. This code eventually became the basis for the aggregate 
    
 
code “proactivity routine.”  In contrast, the aggregate dimension “practices supporting the 
proactivity routine” emerged through the coding process. Our data structure is depicted in Figure 
A (available online).  
Findings 
Employees who engage in proactive work behavior generate goals for and strive toward 
future-focused change at work (Parker & Collins, 2010). At NRG, there was a clear pattern in 
how employees strived toward their proactive goals which was enacted across individuals and 
supported by enabling practices executed by management (see Figure 1). In the next sections, we 
provide evidence for employees’ proactive goal generation, then articulate the phases of the 
proactivity goal-striving process they used to reach this goal. In each section related to the goal- 
striving process, we also identify practices that supported that phase. To illustrate the uniformity 
of proactivity episodes at NRG, in Table 1 we include quotes from three agents at NRG that 
address each phase of the proactive goal-striving process. Later, we draw on these findings to 
introduce proactivity routines.  
----------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 AND TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------ 
 
Proactive goal generation 
Problem recognition and ownership   Similar to anticipation (Grant & Ashford, 2008), 
issue identification (Sonnentag & Starzyk, 2015) and envisioning of a better future (Parker et al., 
2010; Bindl et al., 2012), employees at NRG identified problems that had implications for the 
ongoing work processes and decided to take action to address them (depicted on the left side of 
Figure 1). Importantly, these problems were not one-off incidents but rather long-standing, 
perpetuated patterns that represented concerns to work processes in general. Informants reported 
    
 
their proactive behaviors were often initiated when they recognized that a process at NRG was 
not working in ways that the informant identified as desirable. Instead of working around or 
ignoring issues, informants took ownership over the issue and decided to do something to make 
improvements. While the problems sometimes originated from the processes used to assist 
customers, they were also prompted by a number of other, more internal, circumstances. For 
example, Marie (CSA, 1) explained that other departments were inputting incorrect information 
into accounts, restricting her ability to do her job, prompting her to take ownership of the issue 
so it is no longer a hindrance on her work:  
When there’s a meter exchange they are not putting the dates right so we can’t bill their 
account and I’ve noticed they keep doing it. It is one of those things where you think 
they’ve done it again and I’ve got to the stage where I need to do something about this. 
Similarly, Phillip (CSA, 1) identified an issue with his interactions with another department that 
he felt needed to be permanently changed: “It is a training issue, but [this other department] is 
not reading half the stuff that they should be. And they’re phoning through for what we think are 
really stupid things and it’s a waste of our time.”  Phillip also provided an example relating to 
future software requirements:  
 Our Outlook is changing from Microsoft 2003 to 2007 and by the looks of it it’s going to 
take time to do, and I brought up the fact that in 2007 Excel is slightly different to 2003 
and you can’t open it up if you’ve still got 2003.  If someone sends you an Excel spread 
sheet in 2007, you can’t open it up in 2003. … So I brought that up.  
Thus, the proactivity process was initiated by the recognition that there was either a current 
process-related problem or anticipating a problem in a given work process in the future. Such 
recognition was then followed by the agent’s decision to take charge of improving the situation.  
Proactive goal striving at NRG: Proactivity phases and proactivity enabling practices 
Consulting with managers    Once an agent identified an issue that could be improved in 
their work process, they reported taking action to address the issue, or, in other words, striving to 
    
 
reach their proactive goals (Grant & Ashford, 2008; Parker et al., 2010; Sonnentag & Starzyk, 
2015). This phase commenced for informants at NRG by consulting with their team manager or 
section manager about the issue: “I would probably ask the Manager before or I would ask 
somebody else. I would say, ‘Do you think I could do this or this?’ I would get their advice first” 
(Teresa, CSA, 1). This initial consultation served multiple purposes. First, it served to inform the 
manager that there was a problem in a particular area and to solicit their support. Second, it 
provided agents with information on whether the issue was worth pursuing further. Third, it gave 
agents information on how to appropriately move forward with rectifying the problem. While 
this phase was initiated by agents, it did rely upon feedback from managers. 
 There were three key communication structures through which individuals initially 
confronted their managers with issues. First, as evident in the preceding quotation, they could 
speak to their managers on an impromptu basis and voice their concerns. The other two forms of 
consultation were more formalized. Each team had weekly meetings, labeled “Team Time Outs” 
or “scrums” in which agents were encouraged to bring up problems or suggest changes: 
 We also have what we call TTO’s - “Team Time Outs” – they happen at least once a 
week… And anyone who has got any gripes, or if there are any issues to be brought up 
that can wait until then, then that is when they’re brought up.  (Phillip, CSA, 1) 
These team meetings served as a time and a place that was appropriate for speaking up about any 
particular issues the team was experiencing: “We have like a weekly team meeting where we go 
in and our Manager asks if we have any issues that want resolving and stuff like that so we 
generally raise [any issues] then” (Anne, CSA, 2).  
 A further avenue for consulting management consisted of a physical space in the call 
center where employees could bring up their concerns, labeled “Issue Boards.” Employees could 
voice suggestions on a wide variety of topics (holidays, cafeteria food, etc.) on these boards, but 
it was also a place to post potential problems with work processes:  
    
 
What we have in Pre-Payment are issue boards so each team has a board and they log 
their issues on that board and then the Team Managers collate the issues for each Section 
Manager area sort of ad hoc. Then we will pull out the top three issues and put it on 
another board for the Department and start working through those. (Janet, SM, 1) 
Unlike the other two communication structures, when individuals placed their concerns on issue 
boards, they were passing the issue on to management, with the assumption that a manager 
would take on the issue and try to resolve it or to escalate it to a higher manager. If that was the 
case, then the consulting with and escalating to managers phases (described below) occurred 
simultaneously. More often, however, this initial consultation led agents to continue to have 
ownership of the issue and strive to reach their proactive goal through evidence building.  
Evidence building    In this third phase, informants set out to enhance their case for why 
an issue was worth the manager’s time and effort. While individuals could have given up at this 
phase, our informants reported collecting examples of instances in which a relevant event 
occurred or in which work was inhibited by an existing process.  
I’ve been taking it upon myself to speak to our team and say, ‘If you have an example of 
this please pass it to myself and when we have enough examples, say twenty examples, to 
say it is a common problem, we’ll bring it to the manager.’ (Marie, CSA, 1) 
 
I thought there was no point in [sending out letters and making phone calls] at the same 
time.  So I created examples, asked other people whether it was right, whether they 
wasted time too and if they agreed with what I was saying.  If they did, I got a bit of 
evidence together and I went into a [management meeting]. (Kevin, CSA, 1) 
 
As is clear in these examples, evidence building required individuals to work closely with other 
team members in order to collect examples. Typically, informants brought their team’s attention 
to the issue and gave them a specific time period in which to report back any instances in which 
the issue occurred. Collecting examples demonstrated that the issue at hand was not idiosyncratic 
to the individual but was systemic. By supplying concrete numbers that transcended the 
individuals’ own experience with an issue, the problem became elevated in importance and could 
    
 
be deemed worthy of efforts to resolve. Further, it facilitated the team manager’s ability to argue 
the case for change to the section manager. 
 In order to encourage evidence building, team leaders used the linguistic device 
“observe/analyze/act.” “Observe/analyze/act” was passed down to team members such that they 
were expected to use it when bringing up issues. Miranda (CSA, 2) drew on this device as she 
thought about how to proceed with her proactive action: 
I observed, I analyzed and then I acted. They use that method in the call center a lot: 
observe, analyze and act. So you’re observing to find out what’s happening, then you 
analyze and try to build up evidence with it and then you act on it. 
In many cases, the “analyze” component of observe/analyze/act was translated by managers into 
collecting examples. Lucy (TM, 1), a team manager, describes the importance of her team 
working together in order to produce examples:  
 We do say to [team members] if it’s just one incident, it may just be just the one. So we 
ask them to just get examples. So what my team do, and I’m sure all teams do this 
because team managers do encourage them to do this, is they mail out to the rest of the 
team and they’ll say ‘This is an example of what I’ve come across where this is 
happening, can you get me more examples?’ Then when we’ve got more examples we 
can take the issue forward.  
Pamela (CSA, 1) vividly explains how it was made clear to agents that issues would only be 
taken seriously if they were accompanied with evidence in the form of examples:  
 [Managers are] usually open to it just as long as you’ve got examples. I think if you find 
that you go to a manager with a situation and you don’t have an example of it, they’re 
just going to turn you away so it’s best to get your evidence first. 
In sum, evidence building relied on team members in addition to the focal agent and was 
reinforced via linguistic devices that reminded employees that legitimating their claims through 
examples was necessary for initiating change.   
Escalating to managers    Due to technological constraints on their system and the 
collective nature of their process maps, once the evidence was collected, issues usually required 
    
 
escalation to team managers and, in some cases, section managers. Only rarely did agents 
conclude the process of implementing change solely with their own actions. Instead, the 
hierarchy and structure of the organization required that management implement the final 
change. Marie and Philip both described the importance of having a manager take on their issues:  
Sometimes it is a case of, ‘You’re not a manager so you’ve not got the authority, I’m not 
going to listen to you.’ That is sometimes the case where you’re speaking to a 
Department and they’re not doing what you want them to do and you know that you’re 
right, so you need to take it to a manager to get that resolved really. (Marie, CSA, 1) 
If you think it’s on a priority scale then you go and approach somebody straight away. 
Even section managers sit within the area, so if your team manager is not about you can 
approach another team manager. (Phillip, CSA, 1) 
The process of management escalation was particularly important at NRG because the way in 
which the work was structured meant that if agents or even team managers made changes to a 
process without escalation, it would cause undesirable inconsistencies in the ways in which 
agents did their work. This variance, if protracted over time, could lead to a proliferation of ways 
of doing work which would be difficult to train and to monitor.  
The result of escalating to managers was that managers had to address and take on the   
issues that were raised and act upon them. As a Customer Service Manager explained:  
I’m a big believer in action follow-up. I feel very much that if you are going to get an 
action then you should at least follow it up because otherwise, what’s the point in setting 
it in the first place? Because someone may work on that, do a lot of work towards it and 
then you not follow it up and them think, ‘Have I wasted my time doing this because you 
didn’t really want it anyway?’ There’s a consequence there. (Natalie, CSM, 1) 
Ultimately, the escalating to managers phase was a two-sided process in which employees first 
brought up issues that they had identified and found evidence for. However, because the 
employees were often unable to carry through with the changes themselves due to policies or 
technological constraints, managers had to get involved in actually completing the change.  
    
 
Attending to results    Escalating to managers meant the conclusion of the active 
involvement in bringing about change for most agents. However, similar to the reflecting phase 
suggested by Bindl and colleagues (2012), agents attended to whether their proposed change was 
successfully implemented. Accordingly, the proactivity process did not finish for a specific issue 
until the agent had some knowledge of the results of the issue, communicated through feedback 
from a manager. For instance, Phillip (CSA, 1) believed that his manager was obligated to 
provide him updates on issues he had raised: “I brought up [a potential software problem], and 
that’s been passed to my team manager to escalate. If you do bring up anything like that, they 
have to come back to you with an answer.” Marie (CSA, 1) explained that through interactions 
with her manager, she has learned that issues she brings up will be taken care of, unlike her 
experiences with a previous manager:  
My previous Manager, if I was bringing an issue up now, I don’t think he would ask me 
about it. I don’t think he would follow it up and chase it up for me if I asked him to. 
Whereas my Manager now, I know he will.  
Employees did not just move on once they had escalated a problem to management. They waited 
for information on whether the problem had been addressed and, if so, what specific changes 
were made. This feedback either took the form of a change to the process or an explanation for 
why the process could not be changed. Gretchen (TM, 1) elaborated on the importance of 
management in responding to employee suggestions: 
Even if it is a suggestion that might not go anywhere I am always, “Yes, brilliant, 
fantastic idea but it may not work because …” If I’m telling someone they can’t do it I 
always give them an explanation and say this is why.  
 Although the need to provide feedback on the status of proposed changes was widely 
acknowledged by managers, a number of agents and managers explained that this was the phase 
in which proactive actions often got derailed. Whether managers took action and failed to notify 
employees or did not take action at all, a number of agents noted that suggested changes tended 
    
 
to fall on deaf ears. Thus, despite being encouraged to raise issues, there was sometimes little 
done to address issues. Accordingly, some agents admitted that they, or their colleagues, were 
now hesitant to raise issues because they felt it was a waste of their time and effort: 
I think some people just think what’s the point [in bringing forth issues]? … Maybe they 
have voiced things before and still not got a resolution from it so they can’t be bothered 
raising it because nothing is going to happen if they do. (Teresa, CSA, 2) 
This breakdown of the process was also recognized by management. Christine (SM, 2), for 
instance, recognized the importance of feedback but also saw that not all of the managers were 
providing the feedback that supported proactive action:  
I think something we have fallen down on in the past is we want people to think about 
things and come up with things, but management will sometimes not feedback on them 
very quickly or they won’t do anything with the suggestion or lots of things won’t happen 
for whatever reason, which isn’t then very positive for the people coming up with ideas.  
Such breakdowns were discouraging for employees at NRG. Under such circumstances, 
informants in our study reported being less inclined to act proactively in the future. 
Proactivity routines 
What is striking about proactive work behaviors at NRG is the degree of similarity across 
proactivity accounts. Based on this similarity, we suggest that a routine was in place at NRG that 
prescribed the appropriate ways to make change to work processes. Routines are sets of 
“repetitive, recognizable patterns of interdependent actions, carried out by multiple actors” 
(Feldman & Pentland, 2003: 95; see also Pentland & Reuter, 1994) and stored in procedural 
memory (Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994). Here, we see that once agents determined that they wanted 
to pursue a proactive goal, they went through a specific pattern of actions that involved the 
participation of other individuals such as managers and colleagues in order to reach their 
proactive goal. Accordingly, we suggest that a proactivity routine has been developed at NRG: a 
socially constructed and recognized pattern of how one should go about making changes to work 
    
 
processes in the organization. Proactive work behavior was not a required element of agents’ 
jobs. However, if they did decide to initiate changes to work processes, the proactivity routine 
depicted the steps employees should take in order to initiate such changes. 
Routines include both ostensive and performative aspects (Becker, 2008; Feldman & 
Pentland, 2003) that speak to top-down and bottom-up multi-level processes within organizations 
(Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). The ostensive aspect of routines is the ideal or schematic form of a 
routine that is viewed as a standard operating procedure or norm. Here, the ostensive element 
operates in a top-down manner, depicting how the routine should be performed across 
individuals. In contrast, the performative aspect is the specific actions taken by employees during 
the enactment of the routine. This aspect is more bottom-up, in that it focuses on individual 
performances of the routine. While the ostensive aspect constrains possible actions during the 
enactment of the routine, the performative aspect indicates that individuals still have room for 
improvisation in how the routine is enacted.  
Like other routines, proactivity routines are comprised of both ostensive and performative 
aspects. The ostensive aspect of the routine at NRG is represented in Figure 1 and includes the 
set of actions that organizational members believe were necessary to achieve their proactive goal. 
The performative aspect, in contrast, is the actual steps taken by employees in order to engage in 
this process. Table 1 provides examples of three different performances of the routine. The 
ostensive and performative aspects are mutually dependent: without the normative pattern of the 
routine, the employees would not know how to appropriately engage in proactive actions and 
without employees actually following the phases of the proactive routine in their proactivity 
performances, the routine would cease to exist.  
One of the hallmarks of routines is that they require coordination between multiple 
    
 
participants (Feldman & Rafaeli, 2002). An important characteristic of the proactivity routine at 
NRG was that it involved coordinated action by multiple actors and, in so doing, managed the 
interdependencies between the actors. The proactivity routine was able to manage these 
interdependencies because it included mechanisms for legitimation to managers and consistency 
across individuals. Further, the routine was able to be sustained over time due to a mechanism of 
validation for agents. These theoretical mechanisms are associated with particular phases in the 
proactivity routine, as indicated at the bottom of Figure 1. Here, we define these mechanisms and 
describe the role they played in supporting and sustaining the proactivity routine.  
Drawing on Suchman’s (1995) work on legitimacy, we define a mechanism of 
legitimation as agreed upon ways in which individuals can convince their managers that acting 
upon their issue is desirable, proper, and appropriate. More specifically, members of NRG 
developed a consensual process through which agents could “prove” that there was an issue that 
needed solving. First, informants consulted their managers about the problem in order to 
construct together the need for the problem to be addressed. Second, the evidence-building 
process involved agents collecting examples in which work processes were impaired. Once a 
certain threshold of examples was reached, the agent could escalate the issue to management 
with the expectation that management would implement changes to address the issue.  
The second type of mechanism is a mechanism of consistency. Mechanisms of 
consistency allow any changes that are made in the system to be implemented throughout the 
system rather than to be made only locally, thereby addressing horizontal interdependencies in 
the work. Without mechanisms of consistency, the work processes of one individual could vary 
dramatically from the work processes of the individual sitting at the next desk, compromising the 
system as a whole. At NRG, mechanisms of consistency were included in the routine via the 
    
 
strong role played by managers in the escalating to management phase. By requiring changes to 
go through team managers, and often section or customer service managers, before 
implementation, NRG was able to ensure that changes were initiated across employees and 
teams. Ultimately, the mechanism for consistency relies on the organizational hierarchy in order 
to address managers’ concerns about changes being implemented systematically.  
The mechanism of validation provides employees with information and feedback on the 
functioning of the proactivity routine, which promotes future investment in the routine. At NRG, 
in the final phase of the routine, attending to results, agents indicated that their managers were 
obligated to report back on the status of an issue they had initiated. Further, agents were able to 
observe whether changes were actually being made because the changes would directly impact 
their work processes. Being told about changes was necessary because some changes may be 
sufficiently subtle that agents may not initially notice them without them being brought to their 
attention. Furthermore, simply communicating to the agents how the change was progressing 
signaled to the agent that their concern was being taken seriously. Information about the progress 
of a change gave agents insight into the utility of the proactivity routine and helped determine 
their future engagement with the routine. 
Discussion 
 By drawing on accounts of 39 employees, we have described the social context within 
which proactive work behavior occurred at NRG. In particular, the call center routinized 
employee proactivity such that there were specific steps employees followed to initiate work-
related change at the team or unit level, including the involvement of management and 
colleagues at different phases of the process. As such, through this study, we gain a new 
    
 
perspective on how employee proactivity is embedded in a social context that complements the 
extant proactivity research focused on the social context as input or output to proactivity. 
A central question that one might ask in response to these findings is: can proactivity that 
follows a routine be truly considered proactivity? The actions taken by agents were highly 
consistent with previous definitions of proactive work behavior: self-initiated, future-focused 
actions that involve taking charge in order to make change to work processes (e.g. Parker & 
Collins, 2010). Proactive work behavior at NRG was self-initiated in that agents recognized that 
there were issues at work that needed to be addressed and decided to address them to prevent the 
future reoccurrence of such problems. While proactive work behavior was certainly encouraged 
at NRG, it was not required nor directly incentivized, meaning it was self-initiated rather than 
coerced by management. Further, these actions were future-focused. Similar to problem 
prevention (Parker & Collins, 2010; Frese & Fay, 2001), a specific form of proactivity 
previously identified, informants at NRG identified root causes of problems and sought ways to 
address those issues in the long term. Finally, in order to make these changes to work processes, 
agents had to take charge of the issue and push it through a multi-stage process before handing it 
over to managers to resolve. Put differently, the episodes of proactivity followed a goal 
regulation process, similar to previous depictions of proactivity (Parker, et al., 2010) in which 
individuals generated proactive goals (problem recognition and ownership) (Bindl et al., 2012; 
Grant & Ashford, 2008; Parker et al., 2010; Sonnentag & Starzyk, 2015) and strived to attain 
those goals via consulting with managers, evidence building, and escalating to managers.  
The fact that the way in which these proactive behaviors were implemented followed a 
routine does not diminish the fact that they represented goal-directed action to achieve a 
proactive work goal. While the proactivity routine specified the way in which employees should 
    
 
enact proactive change, it neither required employees to be proactive, nor did it dictate which 
issues to bring up, when to bring them up, or whether to pursue action on them. Whether or not 
to engage in proactivity and which issues to be proactive about were decisions made by 
employees. In the following section, we highlight the theoretical contributions of our findings. 
Theoretical implications  
While the proactive process we found does share many similarities to how proactivity has 
previously been conceptualized, there are also important differences that represent theoretical 
advancement. First, we found that when individuals decide to engage in proactive work behavior, 
they follow socially mandated norms for how proactive work behavior should occur. The notion 
of a proactivity routine shifts our attention away from the individual characteristics that have 
dominated research on proactivity (e.g. self-efficacy beliefs, individual motivation, proactive 
personality, attachment styles; Bakker et al., 2012; Crant, 1995; Ohly & Fritz, 2007; Parker, 
2000; Parker, Williams & Turner, 2006; Wu, Parker, & DeJong, 2014) and toward a higher level 
perspective in which organizational structures and practices shape how proactivity occurs. While 
the proactivity routine we describe is only one way in which the social context shapes 
proactivity, it brings to the fore that in many organizations there are likely ways of acting 
proactively that are encouraged while others are discouraged (Campbell, 2000). In low-
autonomy settings, in particular, socially constructed ways in which to appropriately engage in 
proactivity may be essential for proactivity, due to the little opportunity for idiosyncratic change.  
Second, much of the existing research on proactivity depicts an individual bringing about 
change with relatively little attention to how that individual engages others in the proactivity 
process. In contrast, because the work performed by individuals in our study required high 
degrees of consistency across individuals, making change required coordinating with managers 
    
 
and colleagues. Employees were required to both discuss ideas with managers as well as rely on 
managers in order for the change to be implemented. Further, individuals relied on their peers to 
help them support and legitimate their proposed changes. Thus, the proactivity routine was an 
inherently social process (see Figure B, available online, for an illustration of the role of other 
individuals beyond the focal employee, in the proactivity routine). Previous research on 
interpersonal interactions and proactivity have shown that the relationships that individuals build, 
especially with their managers, influence the impact of proactivity on outcomes such as 
performance, creativity, and citizenship behavior (Thompson, 2005; Li, et al., 2010; Gong, et al., 
2012; Fuller et al., 2015). The theory underlying these relationships is that proactive individuals 
are more likely to build networks that will help them in the future. Our findings advance our 
understanding of the interpersonal aspects of proactivity by arguing that individuals rely on 
others as part of the proactivity process.   
Our findings also indicate that the role managers play in the proactive process evolves 
over the course of a performance of the routine. Specifically, managers become more actively 
involved as a performance continues. In the problem recognition and ownership phase managers 
were not actively involved. Managers then moved on to play the role of advisor in the consulting 
with managers phase, providing both instrumental support in terms of instructing the employee 
on how to proceed, and emotional support, in terms of encouraging employees that they can be 
successful (Ibarra, 1993; Kaufman & Beehr, 1986; McIntosh, 1991). However, at this point, 
managers were generally not actively engaged in addressing the issue. Only in the fourth phase, 
escalating to managers, did managers become actively involved in the implementation process, 
by beginning to bring about the suggested changes. Finally, managers provided feedback to their 
employees on the progress of implementation in the final phase. In sum, while performances of 
    
 
the proactivity routine involved interactions between managers and employees over time, the 
nature of those interactions shifted as the process of proactivity progressed.  
Another contribution of our work is to question the importance of autonomy for 
proactivity. It has been argued that autonomy is a key determinant of proactivity because 
individuals with autonomy are more likely to feel responsible for their work and to develop self-
efficacy and a sense of self-determination over their work (Fuller et al., 2006; Parker, 1998). In 
contrast, low levels of control at work are predicted to inhibit proactivity because employees will 
not feel empowered or efficacious, will ruminate rather than act, will be unlikely to persevere in 
the face of setbacks and will have a passive approach to work (Frese et al., 1996). In a summary 
of this literature, Fuller and colleagues (2006: 1095) assert that autonomy is “necessary but 
insufficient to promote a proactive orientation.” However, we find that employees working in a 
low autonomy context with a proactivity routine in place may act proactively as well. By 
providing a clear and legitimate way in which one can act proactively, a proactivity routine 
allows individuals to feel safe that they are engaging in appropriate behaviors, boosting their 
self-efficacy for proactivity. The standardization of proactivity through practices and norms also 
provided a powerful signal that such behaviors were desired and important for the organization, 
thereby promoting identified self-regulation (Parker et al., 2010; Ryan & Deci, 2000) in which 
individuals ‘take on’ external values and accept them as their own. For example, the 
organization’s statements about the importance of process improvement, combined with 
investment in issue boards (both the establishment of the boards and the weekly allocation of 
time for discussing the boards) and training, shows agents and managers that the organization 
was serious about individuals’ improving work processes, which in turn likely facilitated the 
    
 
individual’s internalization of these organizational values. Thus, a proactivity routine may be at 
least a partial substitute for autonomy in terms of inducing proactive work behaviors.  
It is worth noting that previous research has associated routine work and proactivity. In 
particular, Ohly and colleagues (2006) demonstrated that the routinization of employee’s work 
may encourage proactive behaviors due to the freeing up of cognitive resources as well as 
increased time to focus on proactive behaviors. In their study, the degree to which work is 
routinized was a core characteristic of employees’ jobs that predicted individuals’ creative and 
innovative work behaviors. Our study differs from theirs in that we did not address how routine 
an individual’s job is but, rather, we focus on a particular type of routine that is used for making 
proactive change. While the work of Ohly and colleagues (2006) focused on the routinization of 
the work itself, we are focused on the routinization of how to act proactively.   
Practical implications, limitations, and future research 
In order to address the practical implications and limitations of our research it is 
important to first be clear on the type of organizations where our findings may be most relevant. 
Proactivity routines are likely to develop in organizations with what Batt and Moynihan (2002: 
20) referred to as a mass customization model that incorporates “the efficiency gains of 
mechanization and the attention to service quality found in the professional services model.” By 
combining mass production and professional service models, mass customization models are 
forced to reconciling the competing demands of quality and quantity (Raisch & Birkenshaw, 
2008). While scholars have suggested a variety of methods of coping with these tensions (see 
Parker, 2014), through proactivity routines, organizations can maintain standardized work 
procedures but can also capitalize on individual innovations to update and optimize procedures. 
    
 
The mechanisms theorized to underpin the proactivity routine provide guidance on how 
managers can effectively initiate a proactivity routine. While the specifics of the routine will 
likely be different, incorporating mechanisms for legitimacy, consistency, and validation are 
each important. Mechanisms for legitimacy and consistency allow for control and 
standardization over the proactivity process. Changes that are made are done so across 
individuals rather than within and are only implemented once they have reached a particular 
threshold of importance. Mechanisms of validation ensure that employees gain feedback on their 
efforts, thereby further building their self-efficacy and identified motivation, and, in turn, 
sustaining their engagement in contributing ideas for improving the organization. In this way, the 
organization can remain flexible and adapt to changing customer needs.   
There are limitations and boundary conditions to this study. First, our findings come from 
a case study of one organization. However, we do believe that our findings can generalize to 
theory (Stake, 1978). In particular, we believe that specific routines develop in organizations that 
dictate correct and incorrect ways in which proactivity may occur, thus enabling proactive work 
behavior, albeit in a limited manner. Although there is evidence of other versions of routines that 
promote proactivity in other contexts (such as total quality management practices and suggestion 
schemes (Frese, et al., 1999; Hackman & Wageman, 1995; Hill, 1991), we must be careful not to 
generalize our specific findings. In fact, one of the major implications of our research is the 
necessity of taking contextual characteristics into consideration when attempting to understand 
proactivity in organizations. In particular, we do not anticipate that other organizations would 
employ the exact same routine as we discovered at NRG. While the problem recognition and 
attending to results phases are likely universal because proactivity requires individuals to identify 
issues at work and employees want to understand the outcomes of their actions, the questions of 
    
 
when and how individuals will consult their managers and colleagues and the degree to which 
they will escalate their concerns to managers are likely to vary. Further, the kind of evidence that 
is necessary for such escalation may be different than the evidence building reported here.  A 
related limitation is that we have focused exclusively on proactive work behavior and not other 
forms of proactive behavior such as proactive customer service (Rank et al., 2007) or proactive 
strategic behavior (Parker & Collins, 2007). It is worth investigating in future research which 
types of proactive behavior are likely to be routinized and which types are not.  
One avenue for future research that our findings point us toward is a more practice-based 
perspective on proactivity. A practice perspective shifts the focus away from individuals or 
organizations and toward the patterns of actions that occur within organizations (Feldman & 
Orlikowski, 2011). According to Niccolini (2012: 5) in a practice perspective, “The focus is thus 
not on the action of the individual but on the practice, and the horizon of intelligible action that it 
makes available to the agents.” Our call to view proactivity at a higher level of analysis in order 
to gain new insights on how proactivity occurs within a context is one step toward such a 
perspective. We believe that more fully conceptualizing and operationalizing proactivity routines 
as a practice would uncover additional insights about proactivity in its broad social context.  
A related avenue for future research is to look more closely at the multi-level nature of 
proactivity. In our data, we see that routines, a collective level phenomenon, shape how 
individuals engage in proactive behaviors. Further, similar to Kozlowski and Klein’s (2000: 55) 
notion of emergence in which behaviors originated by individuals lead to collective 
phenomenon, as individuals engage in proactive behaviors, they make changes that impact 
themselves as well as those around them. While our findings concerning proactivity routines 
    
 
point to the existence of multi-level effects, future research should investigate further how 
collective and individual actions interrelate in the proactivity process. 
Finally, up to this point, we have taken a relatively non-critical perspective on the 
formation and use of a proactivity routine. While a proactivity routine can be viewed as a form of 
a high involvement practice (Batt, 2002; Workman & Bommer, 2004), from a more critical 
perspective, such routines may represent “the application of Taylorism by the workers 
themselves” (Hodgson, 2002; Sewell, 1998). Literature on call centers, in particular, has argued 
that despite the apparent domination of supervisory power in these organizational contexts 
(Metcalf & Fernie, 1998), employees may deliberately choose to resist such domination (Bain & 
Taylor, 2000). What these critiques bring to light is that we do not currently know what the 
downsides of this more constrained form of proactivity are, as well as what forms of proactivity, 
if any, it may curtail. We hope our findings will inspire future research to address these issues. 
In sum, although our findings originate from one organizational setting, we suspect that 
in many organizations there are ways of acting proactively that are supported and encouraged, 
and ways that are frowned upon, by other organizational members. As such, it is important to 
understand how the broader social context shapes the proactivity process. We suggest a new 
understanding of proactivity in which it is possible for proactivity to occur through a 
standardized, collective process rather than the more frequently depicted individual process.  
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Table 1 . Narrative accounts of the proactivity routine in the call center 
  Phillip, CSA, 1 Pamela, CSA, 1 Teresa, CSA, 1 
 
Proactive 
goal 
generation 
Problem recognition 
and ownership 
“It is a training issue, but [this 
other department] is not reading 
half of the stuff that they should 
be. They’re phoning through for 
what we think are really stupid 
things and it’s a waste of our 
time.” 
“It’s a fact that at the time my 
team were identifying several 
issues.” 
“We started the trial and we gave it 
a go and gave it a couple of days 
and then approached our manager 
and said, ‘We don’t feel very 
confident with it, we don’t like it.’” 
 Consulting with 
managers 
“We went to the team managers 
and went ‘Look, we’re getting 
stupid calls and they’re stopping 
us from actually doing our 
work.’” 
“So I took it to my manager and 
said ‘This is an issue that we’re 
identifying.’” 
“Our manager put it to us, ‘I 
understand and that’s great but also 
what you need to do is find a 
solution for it as well.’” 
 
 
 
 
Proactive 
goal 
striving 
Evidence building “So our team managers got their 
heads together and said ‘Okay, 
log every call that you think is 
stupid. Log the time it actually 
takes you to do it, complete it – 
start to finish.’ … And we’ve 
estimated it to be over a 100 
hours worth of wasted time.” 
“We collate examples, so we’ll 
take screen prints of particular 
accounts.” 
“So me and my colleague had a 
think about it… You need to find 
out what the issue is first, why 
people’s wraps are so high and then 
go from there.” 
 Escalating to managers “That’s when [we handed this 
over to the] section managers 
and it’s been progressed through 
and through, filtered through.” 
“Collate examples and pass 
them on and say, ‘This is what 
we would recommend as a fix, 
this process should be taken 
out.’” 
“We voiced our opinions first of all 
to her verbally and then put it all in 
an email constructively and 
forwarded it on to her and then she 
took that into a meeting with her 
manager.” 
 Attending to results “They’re now giving [the other 
department] external numbers 
and the numbers to ring.” 
“It was resolved in several 
small processes being 
changed.” 
“I think I feel more enthusiastic 
now that the trial has gone. What I 
said has being taken on board and 
being listened to.” 
 
 
    
 
Figure 1. The proactivity routine and enabling practices at NRG 
 
 
 
